The latest summit of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) demonstrated the reality of China’s power play in the South Pacific. The summit was hosted by Palau. It is one of the three states in the South Pacific region that still recognize Taiwan. As the China-Taiwan competition for recognition plays out in the South Pacific, the PIF summit assumes geopolitical significance.
The leaders of the five members (Fiji, Vanuatu, Samoa, Kiribati, and New Caledonia) sent ministers or deputed officials to fill in for their absence. The leader of the Solomon Islands, Matthew Wale, went to Palau but had to return home owing to the no-confidence motion against him.
The absence of leaders of six members stems in part from China’s warning regarding Taiwan’s presence at the Summit. This is yet another instance of Beijing’s growing diplomatic heft.
The PIF summit was attended by Taiwan’s foreign minister Lin Chia-lung. Taiwan is a development partner of the PIF while China is a dialogue partner.
On Taiwan’s presence, China’s special envoy for Pacific islands affairs Qian Bo warned that, ‘there will always be consequences.’ After the opening ceremony of the PIF, he told reporters that ‘this is objected to by all, so this should not have happened. We think it’s very inappropriate to do so.’
Qian added that the comments did not amount to a threat. However, China has weaponized tourism in the past. Between 2015 and 2017, the number of Chinese tourists to Palau fell from 87,000 to 58,000 after China banned state-run package tours. For a tourism-dependent economy, such factors have had a major impact. Owing to China’s action, Palau’s hotel industry and airlines suffered major losses. Beijing can deploy that tool once again. Alternatively, it could delay developmental assistance, project finance, or find some other way to display its unhappiness.
The 2025 PIF Summit: Non-Invitation
China’s objections towards Taiwan’s presence in the South Pacific region and at the PIF summits are a recurring theme. In 2025, as the Solomon Islands hosted the PIF summit, it decided not to invite any of the 21 dialogue and development partners. Thus, China, the United States (US), and more importantly, Taiwan did not attend the PIF summit last year.
Seeing the behavior of the government in Honiara, the opposition leader in the Solomon Islands, Peter Kenilorea Jr, said that ‘we know this issue is all about China and Taiwan’. The president of the Marshall Islands, Hilda Heine, criticized the Chinese interference in the PIF.
The Solomon Islands switched recognition from Taiwan to China in 2019, and since then, the country has been mired in domestic political flux. Malaita, the second most populous island in the Solomons, is pro-Taiwan. The switch and the deepening ties with China have not gone over well there. A security deal with China, signed in 2022, further aggravated the situation.
It was obvious that China’s hand was at play during the 2025 PIF. This year too, it has been whispered that the sudden political challenge to Matthew Wale, the current prime minister of the Solomon Islands, is linked to his criticism of China’s ICBM test in the region. Beijing has worked hard to prevent any condemnation of the test. Nevertheless, the 2026 summit (Naoero excepted) agreed on a statement noting their concern.
Removing Taiwan References
In the PIF summit of 2024, China applied pressure on the regional body to block the final communique as it contained references to Taiwan. China’s special envoy considered it ‘unacceptable’. He added that ‘a surprising mistake [has been] made by someone’ and it ‘must be corrected’.
Tonga was the host country of PIF 2024, probably one of the most China-friendly countries in the region. Tonga recognized Beijing in 1998, and the Tongan Princess Royal Salote Mafile’o Pilolevu Tuita had suggested that China should establish a Pearl Maritime Road Initiative.
At the 2024 PIF, the Chinese pressure worked and the original PIF communique was amended. The new document that was published had removed the references to Taiwan. This was yet another instance of Chinese involvement in the functioning of the regional body.
Four points are evident in China’s behavior surrounding PIF summits:
- Beijing is putting pressure on PIF member countries and wishes to demonstrate the costs and consequences of Taiwan’s presence. So far, China has done so indirectly, warning suggestively of consequences. (It has not gone down so well in the region). Given the power asymmetry and economic presence of China, for the South Pacific states, these warnings are a serious strategic concern.
- China is attempting to ensure that Taiwan and its friends in the region become the principal reasons for the PIF’s inability to function effectively. It is the ASEAN playbook. China’s friends in ASEAN have not allowed the regional body to adopt a unanimous position on the South China Sea dispute. In the PIF, regional unity is evidently fraying, and Beijing’s activist foreign policy has a role in it. If the PIF is rendered hostage to China-Taiwan rivalry, the cost of Taiwan’s presence becomes high for smaller states in the South Pacific. Looking forward, this helps China undercut Taiwan and may convince the remaining three (Palau, the Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu) to switch.
- Beijing is applying pressure on regional countries and the PIF to drive home its message. China’s engagement with the Solomon Islands puts the country in a difficult position. In fact, China-Solomon Islands ties were the principal reason why key global donor countries were not invited to the PIF in 2025. Honiara did not want to anger China, nor could it completely ignore Taiwan. It chose a diplomatic way out.
- By putting pressure on the PIF to take down the agreed-upon communique and amend the document, China has signaled a willingness to flex its muscles. Beijing demarcated a red line that the PIF cannot cross. Hence, the PIF has become a major forum for China’s power play over Taiwan.
The question for the smaller South Pacific states is how to ensure that the PIF summits are free from Beijing’s pressure tactics and ensure strategic autonomy. This is where the role of other key strategic actors comes in: Australia, France, New Zealand, and the US being the traditional players.
The Quad in the South Pacific
Over the years, Quad countries have been expanding their strategic engagement with the region, and all were present at the Palau summit. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese demonstrated the political priority of the PIF by attending in person. India and Japan were represented by their junior foreign ministers, while the US delegation was led by Deputy Secretary of State, Christopher Landau. The presence of four Quad countries is important in showing strategic intent. In South Pacific geopolitics, showing up is as important as delivering on real, strategic commitments. In May 2026, the Quad countries agreed to develop a port in Fiji.
As a country whose core security interests are at stake, Australia has been taking strategic steps to challenge China’s growing regional presence. The Australian response includes expanding security ties (especially with Papua New Guinea), building sub-sea cables (that will connect the region to the Australian digital network) and continuous political engagement with the region.
In 2026, India was present at the PIF summit. India considers the South Pacific as ‘an integral part of our shared Indo-Pacific’. India engages the South Pacific states through the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC). The third FIPIC summit took place in Papua New Guinea in 2023. The Indian assistance to the FIPIC states is focused on areas like healthcare, education, digital capacity building, water, and renewable energy.
Over the last few years, Tokyo’s engagement with the South Pacific countries has grown manifold. In 2026, Fiji and Japan signed an Official Security Assistance project. It will deliver military equipment and assistance to Fijian troops. Canberra and Tokyo have joined hands to work together in the region beginning with Fiji. Japan has also delivered a $18.4 million loan to Solomon Islands.
The US believes that it is a ‘Pacific nation’. At the Palau summit, the US announced $150 million assistance for the region. The US declared that it would work with the region to address the challenge of energy security — $60 million has been earmarked for it. Washington has also committed to a feasibility study on Tonga’s fuel supply infrastructure.
Washington is working with important Indo-Pacific countries to deliver projects in the South Pacific. The US along with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Taiwan will work together to develop a modern hospital in Palau. The US and New Zealand have joined hands in the Cook Islands to upgrade Omoka Port. Washington intends to modernize two ports and an airfield in the Marshall Islands. In the digital domain, the US is deepening engagement with Tonga, Marshall Islands, Papua New Guinea, and Palau.
The increasing engagement by the Quad and other regional countries (like Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, and New Zealand) will be useful for the South Pacific states to diversify their strategic partnerships and reduce excessive dependence on China by creating more options. This will help to ‘China-proof’ their foreign policies to the extent possible. The region is far too important to be left for Beijing’s power play.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not represent those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com
